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In 1959, the philosopher Carl Hempel presented a paper on psychiatric taxonomy at a 
conference of the American Psychopathological Association. In 1980, the American 
Psychiatric Association published DSM-III, the third edition of their hugely influential 
classification of mental disorders. The DSM-III sought to adopt an ‘atheoretical’ 
approach to classification, and introduced explicit diagnostic criteria setting out the 
number and combinations of symptoms required for diagnosis. Commentators now often 
claim that Hempel's paper was an important contributor to the DSM-III approach. This 
paper argues that this claim is mistaken and that the idea that Hempel influenced the 
DSM-III is a myth. This matters because the idea that Hempel influenced the DSM-III 
has played a key rhetorical role in discussions about the potential relevance and 
importance of the philosophy of psychiatry. 
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The Myth of Hempel and the DSM-III  
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is a classification of 
mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). This 
diagnostic manual now structures mental health research and influences clinical practice 
around the world.  In 1959 Carl Hempel, the philosopher of science, presented a paper on 
psychiatric classification to the American Psychopathological Association. It is often 
claimed that this paper inspired the style of diagnostic criteria that has been employed in 
the DSM since its third edition (DSM-III, 1980).   
 
The APA published the first edition of the DSM in 1952. The first and second editions of 
the DSM (1968) were slim volumes and were used mainly in the United States. In these 
editions, brief narrative paragraphs described typical manifestations of each disorder, and 
some descriptions made reference to psychodynamic concepts and theory. The third 
edition of the classification (DSM-III), published in 1980, broke with earlier tradition in 
multiple ways. Most obviously, the DSM-III was much bigger than the earlier editions, 
and it came to be used around the world.1  In addition, among a number of other 
conceptual innovations, the DSM-III aimed to take a ‘descriptive’ or ‘atheoretical’ 
approach to classification; the idea was that symptoms should be described using as little 
                                                            
1 We cannot fully discuss here the multiple ways in which the DSM-III differed from the 
predecessors and the reasons why it came to be so widely used. A detailed history of the 
DSM-III can be found in Decker 2013. 
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theory as possible (APA, 1980, pp.6-7).2 The DSM-III also introduced explicit diagnostic 
criteria setting out the number and combinations of symptoms required for diagnosis.  
While in the DSM-I and II a condition might be described as having a ‘prolonged 
course’; in the DSM-III there might be a requirement for ‘duration of at least three 
months’.  In the DSM-I and II, symptoms are often described as ‘common’ or ‘typical’. In 
the DSM-III, explicit ‘polythetic’ criteria are employed; these make it clear exactly how 
many symptoms must be present (say, three from a list of five) before a diagnosis can be 
made.  
 
It is regularly claimed that the DSM-III approach to diagnostic criteria was motivated by 
Hempel’s 1959 paper. For example, Allan Frances (who was chairman of the DSM-IV 
Task Force) has written (with co-authors who were also closely involved in the 
development of DSM-IV), 
  
DSM-III introduced methodological innovations based on the earlier 
recommendations of Hempel (1961) and Stengel (1959) for explicit, 
                                                            
2 It is widely accepted that the DSM-III failed to be ‘atheoretical’ (see Cooper and 
Michels (1981), Wakefield (1999)). Still the attempt to be atheoretical clearly affected the 
style of diagnostic criteria. The DSM-I and II referred explicitly to psychodynamic 




descriptive criteria and a neutrality with respect to theoretical orientation. 
(Frances et al, 1994, p.13)  
 
Similarly, a recent book on the DSM-5 (2013) tells readers that, 
DSM-III’s (1980) revolutionary neo-Kraepelinians were dedicated to setting 
up a research program…Embracing Carl Hempel’s logical empiricist 
agenda, they approached mental disorders in terms of operational 
definitions for the purpose of enhancing reliability in diagnosis (Mishara & 
Schwartz, 2013, p.125) 
 
 
Similar claims have been made by many others (e.g. Schwartz & Wiggins 1986; Turner, 
2003; Bentall, 2004; Sadler, 2005, p.74, Chung, 2007; Bolton, 2008, p.3; Bolton, 2012; 
Millon, 2012).  
 
In this paper we re-evaluate the impact of Hempel’s paper, and we show that the idea that 
Hempel influenced the DSM-III is a myth. The paper falls into four sections: In section 1, 
we discuss the context and contents of Hempel’s paper. In section 2, we discuss the early 
reception of Hempel’s paper. In section 3, the distinctive style of diagnostic criteria 
included in the DSM-III is traced to other origins.  In section 4, we consider how it came 
to be widely believed that Hempel inspired the DSM-III.   
 
The question of whether Hempel influenced the DSM-III is important chiefly for 
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understanding the potential role of philosophy for psychiatry. As we discuss in detail in 
section 4, the claim that Hempel influenced the DSM has often been used to demonstrate 
the potential significance of philosophy for psychiatry. If we are right, and Hempel had 
no impact on the DSM-III, then whether, and how, philosophy might contribute to 
psychiatry requires re-evaluation.  
 
More broadly, assessing the role of Hempel’s work in the evolution of the DSMs 
contributes to an understanding of the nature, history, and likely future development of 
the classification.  Most obviously, analyzing Hempel’s impact can inform discussions of 
the philosophical assumptions that underpin the DSM enterprise. A number of scholars 
have argued that the DSM is a ‘logical empiricist’ project, which might be better replaced 
by a classification based on other epistemological foundations (Schwartz and Wiggins 
1986, 1987; Mishara and Schwartz 2013). Quantifying Hempel’s influence is also 
relevant to debates concerning the relative input of different academic communities on 
the development of the DSM. On some accounts, the DSM-III was produced by a small 
‘invisible college’ of like-minded psychiatrists (Klerman 1978, Blashfield 1984). If 
Hempel had a major impact on the creation of the DSM-III, this fact would support the 
view that the DSM-III was the result of broad scholarly input, rather than the work of a 
tight group of insiders (Kendell 1982b).  
 
The role of Hempel’s work in the development of the DSM series has previously been 
considered by other scholars.  In a two-part paper, the psychiatrist and philosopher 
Massimiliano Aragona (2013a, b) has examined the historical and epistemological 
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relationship between neopositivist philosophy of science and the DSM-III. Aragona 
argued that it is unlikely that Hempel directly influenced the DSM-III, although in his 
view the DSM-III approach was consistent with Hempel’s advice regarding 
classification. Aragona concluded that the DSM-III could fairly be seen as resting on 
neopositivist foundations, and he suggested that developing a classification on different 
epistemological presuppositions would be preferable. We agree with Aragona that it is 
unlikely that Hempel influenced the DSM-III, but in section 1.4 we argue that his 
interpretation of Hempel’s paper is mistaken.  
 
The influence of Hempel’s paper has also been considered by Bill Fulford and Norman 
Sartorius (2009). Fulford is a psychiatrist and philosopher who has played a key role in 
establishing the subdiscipline of philosophy of psychiatry (Fulford, no date). Sartorius is 
a psychiatrist who for many years was head of the Division of Mental Health at the World 
Health Organization (Sartorius, no date). Fulford and Sartorius (2009) proposed that 
Hempel’s paper indirectly led to DSM-III style classification systems, but only through 
influencing the thinking of the London-based psychiatrist, Aubrey Lewis. In their 
narrative, a philosopher and a psychiatrist both played indispensable roles in the 
conceptual development of psychiatric classification. Our reading of the argument of 
Hempel’s paper is in broad agreement with Fulford and Sartorius, but in section 2.2 we 
dispute their suggestion that Hempel influenced the DSM-III through the work of Lewis.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is that we bring together the evidence that makes it 
plausible that Hempel did not influence the DSM. We also trace how the myth of 
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Hempel’s influence emerged, and how it has played a key role for authors seeking to 
demonstrate that philosophy is of potential relevance to psychiatry. 
 
1. Hempel’s paper. 
 
1.1 The context of Hempel’s paper: The 1959 conference 
 
Hempel's paper was presented at a conference of the American Psychopathological 
Association in 1959. The conference was organized by Joseph Zubin, who was a 
prominent research psychologist at the Biometrics Unit at the New York State Psychiatric 
Institute (Zubin, 1961, p.v). The conference focused on methodological problems with 
‘field studies’ of the mental disorders. Such studies were mainly epidemiological studies 
about variations in the incidence of mental disorders, and attempts to assess the efficacy 
of therapies in clinical settings.  When Zubin organised the conference he had just 
completed a tour of European psychiatric centres. In his meetings with international 
colleagues, Zubin found a widespread interest in field studies. However, differences 
across countries in the use of psychiatric diagnostic terms made comparing the results of 
such studies difficult.  
 
The 1959 conference was funded by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) (Zubin, 1961, p.v).  At the time, the NIMH had a large and rapidly increasing 
budget (increasing from $50 million in 1959 to $189 million in 1964), and funded much 
epidemiological research into the social determinants of mental health (Grob, 1991, pp.6, 
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64, 68).  Many NIMH grants went to interdisciplinary groups of researchers, often headed 
by psychologists (who tended to have greater training in statistics and research 
methodology than did psychiatrists in this period) (Grob, 1991, p.66). In the late 1950s, 
other organisations were also investing heavily in epidemiological research into mental 
health. The 1959 conference can be seen as one in a series of international conferences on 
related themes that were sponsored by bodies including the NIMH, the Millbank 
Memorial Fund, the British Medical Research Council, the World Federation for Mental 
Health and World Health Organisation (World Health Organization, 1960, p.3).3  
 
After the conference, a number of attendees (M.M. Frohlich, Ernest Gruenberg, Lothar 
Kalinowsky, Morton Kramer, and Benjamin Pasamanick) went on to serve on the 
committee that developed the DSM-II  (Zubin, 1961, pp. 487-489; American Psychiatric 
Association 1968). Some of those present (Paul Hoch, Morton Kramer, Aubrey Lewis, 
Benjamin Pasamanick and Joseph Zubin) also went on to be involved in the US-UK 
Diagnostic Project (Cooper et al, 1972, pvii). The US-UK Diagnostic Project ran from 
                                                            
3 The introduction to the WHO report ‘Epidemiology of Mental Disorders’ (Expert 
Committee on Mental Health, 1960) presents the 1959 conference where Hempel spoke 
as part of series of conferences.  The series included a meeting of the WHO Expert 
Committee on Mental Health in Geneva (held 1959), a meeting at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, held 1958 and sponsored by the Milbank Memorial 
Fund, the British Medical Research Council, the World Federation for Mental Health, and 
the World Health Organization, 
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1966 to 1971 and was designed to investigate cross-national differences in the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. Zubin headed the project, which was also funded by the NIMH. In his 
introduction to the US-UK project results, Zubin wrote that he organised the 1959 
conference ‘to consider the possibility of introducing a more uniform vocabulary and a 
more comparable classification system’ but ‘it became clear that conferences would not 
settle the matter and that a field study was required [i.e. the US-UK project]’ (Cooper et 
al, 1972, p.ix). To sum up, the 1959 conference where Hempel spoke was an important 
international conference, which was itself part of a larger programme of activities that 
aimed to improve methods of classification to facilitate international research in mental 
health.  
 
Zubin invited Hempel to speak at the conference about the general issues of classification 
in science (Hempel, 1961, p.3). Hempel would have been an obvious choice for this task. 
When Hempel presented his paper, he was a Professor of Philosophy at Princeton 
University and had already established himself as one of the most important philosophers 
of his generation. Hempel had also previously written on classification in psychology. His 
first monograph (written with P. Oppenheim) Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik 
(1936) was a work in applied logic that examined the concept of ‘psychological type’.  
 
1.2 Hempel’s paper 
 
The original version of Hempel's paper was titled ‘Introduction to the Problems of 
Taxonomy’, and was first published in the conference proceedings (Zubin, 1961). It was 
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then reprinted as ‘Fundamentals of Taxonomy’ in Hempel’s collection of essays Aspects 
of Scientific Explanation (1965a). The two versions of the paper are identical (except for 
some very minor changes in wording as might be made by a copy-editor).  
 
In his paper, Hempel stated his goal as intending to ‘provide a systematic background for 
a discussion of the taxonomy of mental disorders’ (Hempel, 1961, p. 3). Hempel divided 
his paper into six parts: 
1. Object of this paper 
2. Classes and concepts 
3.  Description and theoretical systematization as two basic functions of 
scientific concepts 
4. Empirical import of scientific terms: Operational definition 
5. Systematic import and ‘natural’ classifications 
6. From classificatory to comparative and quantitative concepts 
   [These titles are quoted directly from Hempel (1961)] 
 
Part 1 was a brief introduction. In Part 2, Hempel clarified some points regarding 
terminology. For example, he defined ‘classes’, ‘concepts’ and ‘extension’. In Part 3, 
Hempel presented the scientific enterprise as one which aims first to describe, and then to 
explain and predict phenomena. During the ‘natural history’ stage, scientists describe 
phenomena, while during the ‘theoretical stage’ theories are developed. Hempel 
explained that by ‘theoretical’ concepts he meant those that ‘refer to various theoretically 
postulated entities, their characteristics, and the processes in which they are involved; all 
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these are more or less removed from the level of directly observable things and events’ 
(1961, p.6). Examples of theoretical terms in science included ‘the electric and magnetic 
fields of physics… chemical valences; molecular and atomic structures…’ (1961, pp.6-7). 
In Part 4, Hempel noted that science aims to be objective and that a widely recommended 
method for achieving this relative objectivity is via the use of operational definitions, as 
described by the physicist P.W. Bridgman. Hempel told his audience that  ‘An operational 
definition for a given term is conceived as providing objective criteria by means of which 
any scientific investigator can decide, for any particular case, whether the term does or 
does not apply to that case’ (1961, p.8).  For example, the concept of ‘harder than’ can be 
operationally defined in terms of the scratch test. Hempel recommended that ‘operation’ 
should be interpreted liberally, such that direct observation qualifies as an acceptable 
operation (1961, p.10). Hempel went on to say,  
 
To apply the preceding considerations to the taxonomy of mental disorders: 
If a classificatory system is to be used with a high degree of uniformity by 
different investigators, the concepts determining the various subclasses will 
have to possess clear criteria of application that can be stated in terms of 
publically ascertainable characteristics. (1961, p.11) 
 
In Part 5, Hempel explained that, as science progresses, he expected classification to 




the concepts used in a given field of scientific inquiry will change with the 
systematic advances made in that field: the formation of concepts will go 
hand in hand with the formulation of laws and, eventually, of theories…In 
the course of such development, classifications defined by reference to 
manifest, observable characteristics will tend to give way to systems based 
on theoretical concepts. (1961, p.16) 
 
Hempel’s expectation was that psychiatric classification would become progressively 
more and more theory driven. He claimed that, with the DSM-I (which was the US 
classification in use when he spoke), the shift to a more theory-based classification was 
already occurring.  He ended, in Part 6, by noting that categorical classifications often 
give way to dimensional systems in order  to cope with borderline cases, and he 
commented that this might also happen with classifications for psychopathology (1961, 
pp. 20-21). 
 
Those who think that Hempel inspired the approach of the DSM-III see his paper as a 
major influence on the changes in psychiatric classification during the last half of the 20th 
century.  Hempel is claimed to have (i) proposed  a new style of classification, through 
the introduction of the concept of ‘operational definitions’  (Kendell, 1975; Brockington 
et al., 1978; Farmer, 1997; Bentall, 2004; Cole et al., 2008), and to have ii) attacked the 
status quo in classification by criticizing the use of psychodynamic concepts in the DSM-
I (Frances et al., 1994; Aragona, 2013a).   We will argue that neither claim is true. 
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Hempel did not introduce operational definitions to psychiatry, and he did not attack the 
approach taken by the DSM-I. 
 
 
1.3 Hempel did not introduce ‘operational definitions’ to psychiatric classification 
 
While it is true that Hempel spoke approvingly of the use of ‘operational definitions’, we 
suggest it is unlikely that Hempel introduced this concept to his audience (Kendler et al., 
2010 and Aragona, 2013b agree). The conference where Hempel spoke was about 
epidemiology and the measurement of psychopathology. Psychologists and psychiatrists 
interested in this field would likely have already been familiar with the idea that key 
scientific concepts should be ‘operationally defined’ when Hempel spoke. 
 
The idea that scientists should make use of ‘operational definitions’ became widely 
discussed by psychologists shortly after the publication of P.W. Bridgman’s (1927) The 
logic of modern physics.  Bridgman, a physicist, explained how concepts might have an 
‘operational character’,  
The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which 
length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much 
as and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is 
determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of 
operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of 




By the 1930s, Bridgman’s ideas were being discussed in psychology journals. Influential 
early advocates of operational definitions in psychology included B.F. Skinner (1931), 
S.S.Stevens (Stevens, 1935a, 1935b), and E.C. Tolman (1951 [1936]). Operationalist 
ideas became especially popular in the guise of behaviourism, and in debates about the 
interpretation of IQ tests (Rogers, 1989). In 1945, one of the most important psychology 
journals, Psychological Review, had a special issue devoted to discussion of 
operationalism (Vol 52 (5), Sept 1945).4 Psychologists would have been aware of 
operational definitions prior to Hempel’s paper. 
 
In psychiatry, too, there had been discussion of operational definitions prior to Hempel’s 
paper. In his 1952 presidential address to the American Orthopsychiatric Association, 
James Cunningham (1952) discussed Bridgman’s work and advocated for the use of 
operational definitions.  A. Ellis (1956) had attempted to operationalise key 
psychoanalytic concepts. Thomas Szsaz employed operationalist ideas to argue that there 
are important ambiguities in concepts of ‘neurosis’, ‘psychosis’ and ‘normal’ (Hollender 
and Szsaz, 1957; Szsaz, 1959). We conclude that in the late 1950s, psychologists and 
                                                            
4 Rogers (1989) and Green (1992) examine papers in this special issue and show that by 
this time ‘operationalism’ in psychology referred to a fairly diverse family of views. 
‘Operationalists’ of all stripes would have been familiar with the idea that ‘operational 
definitions’ could improve reliability. 
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psychiatrists interested in research on classification would already have been familiar 
with the idea that key scientific terms should be ‘operationally defined’.  
 
 1.4 Hempel did not attack the DSM-I 
 
According to Aragona (2013a), Hempel considered the DSM-I to be a psychodynamic 
classification,5 and also thought that psychodynamic concepts could not be given 
adequate operational definitions. Aragona claimed that Hempel’s paper therefore 
mounted a powerful argument against the DSM-I, 
 
To sum up, Hempel asserts that: (a) the terms used in the DSM-I 
classification system (e.g. those defining a conversion reaction) ‘refer 
neither to directly observable phenomena, such as overt behavior, nor to 
responses that can be elicited by suitable stimuli’ (p. 140), and (b) there are 
no definite ways of putting psychodynamic theories ‘to a test by applying 
them to concrete cases’ (p. 141). On this basis he can conclude that the 
DSM-I mental disorders did not meet either the empirical interpretation 
criterion or the testability principle, and for this reason the DSM-I 
taxonomy should be rejected not as false but as meaningless. (Aragona, 
2013a, p.174) 
 
                                                            
5 In later work, Aragona (2015) argues that the DSM-I was only partly psychoanalytic. 
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We disagree with Aragona’s reading of Hempel’s argument. We agree with Aragona that 
Hempel thought that the DSM-I had started psychiatric classification along a theoretical 
path, but we will argue that Hempel did not think that the use of psychodynamic theory 
made the DSM-I illegitimate (Wakefield, 1999 and Fulford & Sartorius 2009 concur).  
 
It is true that Hempel had concerns about some specific uses of psychodynamic concepts. 
He mentioned that ‘One of the main objections against various types of contemporary 
psychodynamic theories, for example, is that their central concepts lack clear and uniform 
criteria of application…’ (Hempel, 1961, p.8) and he also stated that  
 
the operational reformulation of psychoanalytic concepts proposed by Ellis, 
which relies on such ‘operations’ as thinking, remembering, emoting, and 
perceiving (in an enormously comprehensive sense) provides no clear 
criteria of application for the terms of psychoanalysis and no objective ways 
of testing psychoanalytic hypotheses  (Hempel, 1961, p.11). 
 
Clearly Hempel thought that some uses of psychodynamic concepts were problematic. 
However, we interpret these comments as attacks on specific problematic examples. We 
think that Hempel did not reject the use of psychodynamic concepts in general.  
 
In support of our reading, consider this passage, where Hempel said that the DSM 
definition of conversion disorder made reference to theoretical notions, e.g., ‘the impulse 
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causing the anxiety is “converted” into functional symptoms in organs’ (Hempel, 1961, 
p.7 quoting American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p.32). Hempel commented:  
 
Clearly, several of the terms used in this passage refer neither to directly 
observable phenomena, such as overt behaviour, nor to responses that can 
be elicited by suitable stimuli. Those terms have a distinct meaning and 
function only in the context of a corresponding theory; just as the terms 
‘gravitational field’, ‘gravitational potential’, and so on have a definite 
meaning and function only in the context of a corresponding theory of 
gravitation (Hempel, 1961, p.7)   
 
Since ‘gravitational field’ is a theoretical, yet well accepted, concept in science, we infer 
that Hempel saw no inherent problem with concepts such as ‘conversion.’  A slightly 
earlier paper ‘A logical appraisal of operationism’ (1954) helps clarify Hempel’s views. 
In this paper, Hempel made it clear that he did not suppose that all properly scientific 
terms would be capable of simple operational definition.  He supported Pierre Duhem’s 
claim that empirical testing is ‘properly applicable to entire theoretical systems rather 
than to individual hypotheses’ (Hempel, 1954, p.219). We conclude that Hempel saw no 
intrinsic problem with the use of theoretically-defined terms, and no intrinsic problem 
with psychodynamic theory.  Indeed, Hempel concluded his paper by stating that 




It is not for me to speculate on the direction that theoretical developments in 
this field may take and especially on whether the major theories will be 
couched in biophysiological or biochemical terms or rather in 
psychodynamic terms lacking in over-all physiological or physiochemical 
interpretation. Theoretical systems of either kind can satisfy the basic 
requirements for scientific theories. (Hempel, 1961, p.18) 
 
This quote is consistent with Hempel’s comments elsewhere regarding psychodynamic 
and psychoanalytic theory.   In writings from the late 1950s and early 60s, Hempel 
presented psychoanalytic explanations as somewhat sketchy, but potentially improvable, 
scientific explanations (1965b [1958], 1965c [1959], 1965d).  
 
We conclude that, although Hempel thought that the DSM-I was partly based on 
psychodynamic theories, Hempel did not consider this to be a weakness in the DSM-I 
classification. We think that Hempel considered the DSM-I to be a reasonable step in a 
developing science, rather than a mistake that needed correcting. 
 
 
2. Early reception of Hempel’s paper 
 
In our reading, Hempel did not introduce operational definitions to psychiatry, and he did 





2.1 Early reception 
Erwin Stengel, then a Professor of Psychiatry at Sheffield University, U.K. was the 
discussant of Hempel’s paper at the conference. His discussion was published alongside 
Hempel’s paper in the conference proceedings (Stengel, 1961).  Much of Stengel’s 
discussion was devoted to the question of whether psychiatric conditions could be 
considered mutually exclusive, as Hempel supposed, and with a consideration of the 
extent to which current psychiatric classifications might be considered ‘descriptive’ or 
‘theoretical’. Stengel also discussed, and approved of, Hempel’s suggestion that 
diagnostic terms should be operationally defined. Stengel was clearly already familiar 
with the idea of operational definitions. Indeed, Stengel had himself previously argued 
that researchers talking about ‘psychopathic personality’ should provide an ‘operational 
definition’ for this concept (Stengel, 1958).  
 
At the time of the 1959 conference, Stengel was working on a review of international 
psychiatric classifications for the WHO, and in addition to commenting on Hempel’s 
paper, he presented an early version of his report at the conference. In the final version of 
his report, Stengel included a half-page summary of Hempel’s paper (1959, pp.611-612). 
In Stengel’s precis, Hempel’s paper was characterised as providing a useful conceptual 
framework for thinking about classification. Stengel did not interpret Hempel as being 
critical of the DSM-I.  Stengel’s report recommended that diagnostic terms should be 





Early citations to Hempel by Michael Rutter, and by J.K Wing, made somewhat similar 
use of Hempel’s paper. Michael Rutter was a child psychiatrist, based at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, London.  His much-cited 1965 discussion of classification in child psychiatry 
cited Hempel’s paper and also advocated the adoption of ‘operational terms’, but Rutter 
did not cite Hempel in relation to operational definitions. Instead, the reader was directed 
to Hempel (1961) only as a source where ‘the principles of classification have been 
clearly outlined’ (Rutter, 1965, p.72). J.K. Wing, also based at the Institute of Psychiatry, 
developed explicit rating scales for psychiatric symptoms (most famously the Present 
State Examination (Wing et al. 1974)). In an early paper setting out a rating scale for 
schizophrenic symptoms, he cited a preprint of Hempel’s paper – but only in relation to 
the claim that a classification should be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (Wing, 
1961, p.866).   
 
Generally, in the first decades following Hempel’s talk, when he was cited, Hempel's 
paper was interpreted as a handy overview of the role that classification might play in a 
science, and as outlining some of the logical requirements for an adequate classification 
system. Hempel was used as support for claims such as that classification plays an 
important role in science, that over time classifications tend to move from being 
descriptively to theoretically based, and that ideally the categories in a classification 
should lead to useful  generalizations (Zubin, 1967; MacMahon & Pugh, 1970; Paykel, 
1972; Strauss, 1973; Becker, 1974; Blashfield & Draguns, 1976; Adams et al., 1977; 




Zubin wrote a critique of an early draft of the DSM-III in 1977. As the conference 
organiser who invited Hempel to speak, if Zubin thought that Hempel’s paper had 
significantly shaped the DSM-III, Zubin might have been expected to mention Hempel in 
his review.  Zubin did not cite Hempel’s paper. Rather Zubin worried that the DSM-III 
had been shaped by economic and professional concerns, and that the DSM-III could not 
be considered a scientific classification.    He went on to propose a way forward.  Zubin 
suggested the development of an interdisciplinary ‘commission for the classification of 
human behavior’ – which would include input from not only psychologists, psychiatrists 
and epidemiologists, but also philosophers of science, historians, taxonomists, and 
linguists. A classification of abnormal behaviour would be created as a subset of this 
broader project (Zubin, 1977, p.7). Clearly, at this stage, Zubin considered constructing a 
philosophically-informed classification of psychopathology to be a future project as 
opposed to something that had been achieved or even attempted in the DSM-III. Zubin’s 
failure to cite Hempel in the context of his proposal is notable.  
 
 
2.2 Aubrey Lewis’ Hempel 
 
In their chapter, ‘The secret history of ICD and the hidden future of DSM’, Bill Fulford 
& Norman Sartorius (2009) argued that Hempel’s paper motivated one audience member  
- Aubrey Lewis -  to develop ideas that led to the development of symptom-based 
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diagnostic criteria in the DSM-III style.  Fulford and Sartorius claimed that Hempel’s 
paper influenced the DSM-III - but via Lewis.  
 
Aubrey Lewis was Professor of Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, from 
1948-1966, and was the most influential UK-based psychiatrist in the postwar period 
(Jones, 2003). Lewis had long been concerned about the methodological difficulties 
involved in assessing the prevalence of mental disorders, and in evaluating therapeutic 
efficacy. From as early as 1938, Lewis had been concerned that diagnostic terms were 
employed differently across various countries (Lewis 2003[1938], pp.89, 107, 120). 
 
Transcripts of the discussion following the oral presentation of Hempel’s paper were 
published in the Conference Proceedings (Zubin, 1961).  Aubrey Lewis said this:   
 
In psychiatry to make a classification based on theory is what we all would 
like, and what we believe we cannot at the moment attain – because, as Dr 
Hempel clearly stated, the requirements are not met by any of the theories 
prevailing in psychiatry at the present time. 
Therefore I would suggest that for the purpose of public 
classification [i.e. those for international use] we should eschew categories 
based on theoretical concepts and restrict ourselves to the operational, 




In these comments, Lewis set out two key ideas: (1) current psychiatric theories are 
unsuitable for use as the basis of a public classification, and (2) public classifications 
should make use of operational definitions.  Lewis’s interpretation of Hempel’s paper 
was peculiar. In his paper, Hempel did not claim, let alone ‘clearly state’, that there was a 
general problem with existing theories in psychiatry.  Whatever the explanation for 
Lewis’s misinterpretation, the idea of that a public classification should be descriptive 
took on a crucial significance.  After the conference, Lewis came to head the committee 
that developed the UK-produced A Glossary of Mental Disorders (Sub-committee on 
Classification of Mental Disorders, 1968), and then the WHO committee that produced 
Glossary of Mental Disorders and Guide to their Classification (WHO, 1974). In Fulford 
and Sartorius’ telling, the WHO Glossary made use of descriptive symptom-based 
definitions. The Glossary then fed into the drafting process of the ninth edition of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD, the classification published by the World 
Health Organization) and influenced the DSM-III. Fulford and Sartorius concluded ‘It 
was from this glossary, as described earlier, that current descriptive international 
classifications of mental disorder, the ICD and DSM, are ultimately derived.’ (Fulford & 
Sartorius, 2009, p.37). 
 
We think that Fulford and Sartorius are mistaken and that the DSM-III approach to 
diagnosis cannot be traced to the WHO Glossary. The Glossary contains brief paragraphs 
that describe a characteristic patient. It is true that these descriptions are written in plain 
language, are generally symptom-based, and make frequent use of examples. However, 
the WHO Glossary lacks much of the specificity found in the DSM-III. Notably, the 
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Glossary is often vague about the time period during which symptoms must be present. It 
is also often unclear how many symptoms are required for diagnosis; some symptoms are 
described as being ‘characteristic’ or ‘common’ without it being clear whether or not they 
are essential.  Take, for example, the description of 300.5 Neurasthenia 
 
Includes a neurosis characterized by fatigue, irritability, headaches, 
depression, insomnia, difficulty in concentration, and lack of capacity for 
enjoyment (anhedonia). It may follow an infection or exhaustion, or arise 
from continued emotional stress. 
Excludes depressive neurosis (300.4); anxiety neurosis (300.0); physical 
disorders of presumably psychogenic origin (305); mental disorders similar 
to that defined above associated with physical conditions (309) (WHO, 
1974, p.40) 
 
In contrast, the DSM-III criteria for Dysthymic Disorder (which the DSM-III index takes 
to be equivalent to neurasthenia) lists 13 possible symptoms of which at least three must 
be present, and specifies that symptoms must have been problematic for at least two years 
(APA, 1980, p.222).  
 
We cannot rule out the possibility that the WHO Glossary had some influence on the 
DSM-III. Robert Spitzer, who became the chairperson for the DSM-III, was familiar with 
the WHO Glossary; he reviewed it for the American Journal of Psychiatry (Spitzer, 
1975). The Glossary and the DSM-III are similar in that both sought to be descriptive, 
 26 
 
symptom-based classifications. However, while the DSM-III characteristically specifies 
time periods and numbers of symptoms, the Glossary does not. In his review, Spitzer 
complained that the Glossary (and also the DSM-II) ‘...suffer from a lack of precision, of 
operational criteria for making the diagnoses…’ (1975, p.881).  In developing the DSM-
III, Spitzer sought to provide ‘operational criteria’; he did not think that the Glossary 
included such criteria. The key features of diagnostic criteria the DSM-III cannot be 
traced back via Lewis’s WHO Glossary to Hempel.    
 
2.3 Robert Kendell’s Hempel 
 
Robert Kendell was not at the 1959 conference, but was a key early citer of Hempel’s 
paper.  Kendell was a British psychiatrist, working at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, 
and then at Edinburgh University (Kendell, 2000). He is best known for The Role of 
Diagnosis in Psychiatry (1975), an influential work that continues to be regularly 
discussed. In our analysis of citations to Hempel’s paper, Kendell is the first author to 
interpret Hempel as calling for ‘operational criteria’ in the DSM-III style, and the first to 
claim that Hempel’s paper influenced approaches to classification in psychiatry.  Kendell 
knew Robert Spitzer, as they both worked on the US-UK Diagnostic project (Cooper, 
2003), and it is worth considering whether Hempel could have influenced the DSM-III 
through Kendell’s work. 
 
Kendell cited Hempel in various writings from the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Kendell 




Some years ago, the philosopher Carl Hempel tactfully suggested to an 
audience of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists interested in problems 
of diagnosis and classification that they should tackle this situation 
[problems of diagnosis caused by the polythetic and inexact nature of 
syndromes] by developing ‘operational definitions’ for all the various 
categories of illness in their nomenclature’ (Hempel 1961).  (quoted from 
Kendell, 1975, p. 25) 
 
Hempel recommended the use of operational definitions to achieve 
uniformity. In response to this suggestion, psychiatrists in Europe and 
America have drawn up a large number of criteria for the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, thus replacing inarticulate confusion by a Babel of precise 
but differing formulations of the same concept. (Brockington, Kendell & 
Leff, 1978, p. 387) 
 
Kendell similarly cited Hempel in Kendell, Brockington & Leff (1979, p.25) and Kendell 
(1982a, p.1334). Kendell’s interpretation of ‘operational definition’ was close to that 
employed in DSM-III. Kendell made it clear that an operational definition of a mental 
disorder should set out rules detailing how many symptoms, in what combinations, are 
required for diagnosis. He wrote 
The traditional polythetic criterion has to be converted to a monothetic one. 
This can be done quite easily. Instead of saying that the typical features of 
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disease S are A,B,C,D & E and most of these should be present before the 
diagnosis is made, A,B,C,D and E must be combined algebraically, so that 
which combinations satisfy the criterion O and which do not is specified 
unambiguously. It might be stipulated for instance that any three, or any 
four, of the five would satisfy O. (Kendell, 1975, p.26) 
 
This idea was not explicitly explored by Hempel himself. Kendell plausibly interpreted 
Hempel’s call for operational definitions in this way for two reasons. First, Kendell had 
previously worked using the numerical statistical techniques of factor analysis and cluster 
analysis to classify varieties of depression.  Some of the depression symptom rating 
scales he used in this work included ‘3 symptoms from 5’ type rules (Kendell, 1968). 
Second, during his studies in the philosophy of science, Kendell had been impressed by 
the works of Karl Popper (Kendell, 2000). To a Popperian, specifying the number of 
symptoms that is required for a diagnosis would seem natural (this specification is what a 
clinician needs in order to know exactly when someone does or does not qualify for a 
diagnosis).  
 
Kendell interpreted Hempel as advocating for definitions of a form very like those 
included in DSM-III.  Spitzer read, and liked, Kendell’s 1975 book, The Role of 
Diagnosis in Psychiatry. In a review, Spitzer noted that 
  
Kendell points out the central issue of definition – that is, indicating which 
features of the category are essential and always present, which features are 
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commonly present but may be absent, and, finally, which features must be 
absent for the diagnosis to be made. (1977, p.41) 
 
However, we think that the use of polythetic definitions in the DSM-III cannot be traced 
back to Kendell’s book. Kendell’s book was published too late to have this influence. By 
the mid-1970s, when Kendell’s book was published, work on the DSM-III was already 
well advanced (Spitzer et al. 1975a). We cannot rule out the possibility that Spitzer might 
have been influenced by informal conversations with Kendell during the US-UK 
Diagnostic Project (Cooper, 2003, p.280). However, whether or not Kendell influenced 
Spitzer in such a way, another, and better documented, predecessor for the DSM-III 




3. Tracing the origins of the DSM-III diagnostic approach: The ‘neo-Kraepelinians’  
 
The diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-III were explicitly modelled on those of two 
earlier sets of diagnostic criteria that were developed for research purposes. The DSM-III 
was patterned on the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer et al., 1975b), which in 
turn was based on the Feighner criteria (Feighner et al., 1972).The authors of the 
Feighner criteria were John Feighner, Eli Robins, Samuel Guze, Robert Woodruff, 
George Winokur and Rodrigo Muñoz. The authors of the Research Diagnostic Criteria 
were Robert Spitzer, Eli Robins and Jean Endicott. These eight authors and their 
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immediate colleagues at Washington University in St. Louis and the New York State 
Psychiatric Institute formed a tight-knit group of researchers (an ‘invisible college’) who 
have come to be known as the ‘neo-Kraepelinians’ (on the basis that their approach to 
classification had some commonalities with that of Emil Kraepelin, the great nineteenth 
century psychiatrist) (Klerman, 1978; Blashfield 1982, 1984). The Feighner criteria and 
the RDC employed the same style of polythetic definitions (i.e. ‘3 of 5’ rules) that appear 
in the DSM-III.    
 
There is no evidence that any of the authors working on the Feighner criteria or the RDC 
were influenced by Hempel’s paper. None of them were in the audience at his talk, and 
none of them cited Hempel’s paper. When directly asked, both Spitzer and Muñoz have 
explicitly denied that Hempel had any influence on their thinking (Kendler et al., 2010, p. 
140).Where, then, did the idea of constructing diagnostic criteria in this style originate?  
 
In their paper on the history of the Feighner criteria, Kendler et al.  (2010) note that 
polythetic definitions were employed for research on rheumatological disorders in the 
1940s and 50s (Jones, 1944; Rutstein, et al., 1956; Ropes et al., 1957; Ropes et al., 1958). 
Kendler et al. suggest that Guze, who had trained in internal medicine, and then became 
part of the neo-Kraepelinian group, would have known of this work. However, the 
evidence that Guze knew of the rheumatism papers is somewhat weak; a Google scholar 




We think that Mandel Cohen, a neurologically-oriented psychiatrist at Harvard, provides 
a better documented link between the use of explicit diagnostic criteria for 
rheumatological disorders and the introduction of explicit diagnostic criteria in 
psychiatry.  Cohen graduated in medicine from John Hopkins University in 1931, where 
he worked first as a cardiologist before switching to psychiatry (Healy, 2002). Early in 
his career, Cohen worked on ‘rheumatic heart disease’, which can occur as a 
complication of rheumatic fever (Healy, 2002). Thus, Cohen would plausibly have been 
familiar with the style of diagnostic criteria that had been employed in the 1940s work on 
rheumatic fever (Jones, 1944, p. 211).  
 
Cohen went on to conduct a series of studies on anxiety neurosis for the Armed Forces. 
Cohen and his colleagues suspected that the same condition was being given a variety of 
different names – neuro-circulatory asthenia, Da Costa’s syndrome, soldier’s heart, effort 
syndrome, etc. In his work Cohen depended on precisely defining the symptoms required 
for diagnosis. He employed the characteristic ‘3 from 5’ style that would later by used in 
the Feighner criteria, the RDC, and the DSM-III.  For example, 
 
Symptoms of neurocirculatory asthenia as defined for this study included 
breathing trouble and symptoms from two of the following three groups: (1) 
palpitation or chest pain; (2) nervousness, dizziness, faintness, attacks or 
spells, and (3) feelings of fatigue or tiredness or limitation of activity’. 
(emphasis added, Wheeler et al., 1950, p.878. For a similar approach see 
Cohen et al., 1951) 
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Cohen later went on to employ a similar definitional style when doing research on manic-
depression (Cassidy et al., 1957).  
 
Cohen’s relationship with Eli Robins would have enabled his influence on the neo-
Kraepelinian researchers.  Robins worked with Cohen as resident in neurology and 
psychiatry.  Robins was a co-author of a paper with Cohen on hysteria in men (Purtell et 
al., 1951; Healy, 2002). Cohen was also an author of a study that employed diagnostic 
criteria that became the basis for the definition of depression in the Feighner criteria 
(Cassidy et al., 1957; Feighner, et al., 1972; Kendler et al., 2010, p. 136). 
 
Cohen could not have been influenced by Hempel’s paper; he started employing the ‘3 
from 5’ diagnostic style years before Hempel’s presentation. In her history of the DSM-
III, Hannah Decker also identified Cohen as an early user of polythetic diagnostic 
criteria. She suggested Cohen might have been directly influenced by Bridgman, the 
physicist who first championed operational definitions, as they would have been 
contemporaries at Harvard (Decker, 2013).  While this may have been the case, it is 
notable that Cohen never cites Bridgman, and his early papers did not use the language of 
‘operational criteria’ (Wheeler et al., 1950; Cohen et al., 1951). We think it plausible that 
Cohen would have become familiar with the use of diagnostic criteria in this style 
through his work on rheumatic heart disease.   
 
We think that the style of polythetic criteria employed in the Feighner criteria can be 
traced back to Cohen. The RDC was modelled on the Feighner criteria. Robert Spitzer 
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co-authored the RDC, and then later became chair for the DSM-III.  Spitzer’s interests 
prior to working on the RDC plausibly also primed his enthusiasm for explicit polythetic 
diagnostic criteria.  During the 1960s, Spitzer created rating scales (such as the Mental 
Status Schedule) that aimed to improve the reliability with which researchers recorded 
symptoms (Spitzer, Fleiss, Burdock & Hardesty 1964; Spitzer, Endicott & Cohen 1964). 
He also developed a computer program, DIAGNO, which made DSM-II diagnoses when 
given input about a patient’s symptoms (Spitzer & Endicott, 1968).  
 
In the early 1960s, other researchers were also developing similar research programmes. 
Notably, J.K.Wing and his colleagues at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, were also 
seeking to develop reliable rating scales for psychiatric symptoms, and employed 
computer-based diagnosis (Brugha et al., 2011). Both Wing and Spitzer went on to work 
on the US-UK Diagnostic project, and both the Mental Status Schedule (developed by 
Spitzer and Endicott), and the Present State Examination (developed by Wing and 
colleagues) were used in the study (Cooper et al., 1972). The project also made some use 
of Spitzer’s computer program, DIAGNO. 
 
The computer programmes for diagnosis, developed by Spitzer and Wing and their 
colleagues, both employed explicit algorithms to turn symptom ratings into diagnoses. 
The explicit diagnostic criteria included in the DSM-III, were modelled on the RDC (and, 
the RDC in turn, on the Feighner criteria), but they can also be seen as paper-based 




To summarize, we suggest that the approach to diagnostic criteria employed in the DSM-
III had the following lineage.  Explicit polythetic diagnostic criteria were first employed 
in work in rheumatism. Cohen, who would likely have known about this definitional 
approach through his work on rheumatic heart disease, employed a similar approach in 
studies of anxiety neurosis, manic-depression and hysteria. Robins had worked with 
Cohen when they both did research on hysteria. Robins then became a leader of the neo-
Kraepelinians based in St Louis.  The St. Louis group wrote the Feighner criteria.  At 
around the same time, the computer programmes, CATEGO and DIAGNO, were 
developed by Spitzer and Wing and their colleagues, and both employed explicit 
algorithms to turn symptom ratings into diagnoses. The Feighner criteria were later 
modified and expanded, becoming the RDC.  And, the RDC proved to be a pilot version 
for the revolutionary DSM-III. Hempel’s paper plays no role in this history. 
 
 
4. If the myth of Hempel is not true why do people believe it? 
 
4.1 Overall citations to Hempel’s paper 
 
Changes in interest to Hempel’s paper can be shown graphically in terms of citations. The 
data for the graph shown in Figure 1 were gathered from Google Scholar (as of 26 
January 2018). Not all of these citations are papers connected to mental health – authors 
interested in classification in other areas also sometimes cite Hempel’s paper. In addition, 
the figures are not fully reliable.  Google Scholar misses some citations (particularly from 
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the earlier decades). Nonetheless the chart gives some insight into the shifts in interest in 
Hempel’s paper. The total volume of publications in mental health, the scope and 
accuracy of Google Scholar, and general interest in psychiatric classification, all vary 
over time. In order to gain some insight into shifts in interest in Hempel’s paper 
specifically we compare citations to his paper with those to two comparable papers. The 
comparison papers are Stengel’s review of international classification, discussed in 
section 2.1 (Stengel, 1959), and a paper by Ward, Beck et al. (1962) ‘The psychiatric 
nomenclature: Reasons for diagnostic disagreement’ which was published in the Archives 
of General Psychiatry.  Ward, Beck et al. (1962) played a key role in convincing 
psychiatry that ambiguities in diagnostic criteria reduced the reliability of psychiatric 
diagnosis, and was published around the same time as the papers by Hempel and Stengel.   
 
 













Hempel 1961 & 1965
Stengel 1959





In the fifteen years immediately after the publication of these papers and leading up to the 
publication of DSM-III (1966-1980), there were 80 citations to Ward, Beck et al. (1962), 
74 to Stengel (1959) and 43 to Hempel (1961, 1965). The data shown in Figure 1 support 
our suggestion that Hempel's paper initially had a relatively small impact. 
 
The citation data show a persistent secondary peak in the fifteen years leading to the 
DSM-5 (2001 to 2015). During this time, Hempel’s paper collected nearly four times the 
number of citations that it did during 1966-1980 (i.e. the time period leading to the DSM-
III). Citations to Stengel (1959) increased by a factor of 1.4 when comparing the same 
time periods. The interest in these papers suggests that the controversies and struggles 
surrounding the creation of the DSM-5 led a number of authors to think about the 
conceptual background for the DSM-III. Ward, Beck et al. (1962) was also cited in the 
lead up to DSM-5, but in this case the citations in the fifteen years leading up to DSM-5 
were less than the original peak (25% drop). 
 
The citation data in Figure 1 show that Hempel’s paper has come to be considered far 
more important in recent decades than when it was initially published.6 While other 
papers concerned with fundamental issues connected to psychiatric diagnosis were also 
                                                            
6 A more detailed analysis of citations to Hempel’s paper, which breaks down citations to 
Hempel 1961 and 1965 can be found in the supplementary materials. 
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revisited  in the lead-up to DSM-5, interest in Hempel’s paper increased more than did 
interest in comparable papers. Looking through the citations to Hempel’s paper, it is clear 
that Hempel’s paper is cited fairly regularly in both mental health journals and in works 
in the philosophy of psychiatry.7 In many cases, Hempel is cited only in passing. For 
most of those who cite Hempel’s paper little hangs on the question of whether he 
influenced the DSM. However, the idea that a philosopher played a key role in shaping 
the DSM-III sometimes plays an important rhetorical role, as will be discussed below.   
 
4.2 Hempel employed  to argue for the importance of philosophy for psychiatry 
 
Hempel’s paper has been fairly regularly cited by writers who seek to demonstrate the 
importance of  philosophy for psychiatry. Consider, for example, the role attributed to 
Hempel in a piece written for the Psychiatric Bulletin to advertise The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists Philosophy Group:  
 
One final question remains when considering the future of the group. 
Besides training and teaching, is there still significant research to be done at 
the interface of philosophy and psychiatry? In fact, the two disciplines 
continue to advance each other's knowledge, even if one discounts 
psychiatric medical ethics. The establishment of operational criteria for 
                                                            





psychiatric disorder was an essential step in the development of modern 
psychiatry. This derived directly from the work of Carl Hempel (e.g. 1961)  
-  a philosopher. (Foreman, 1993, p. 676) 
 
As another example, a 1994 book titled Philosophical perspectives on psychiatric 
diagnostic classification, edited by John Sadler, Michael Schwartz and Osborne Wiggins, 
includes a reprint of Hempel’s paper as an appendix. The introduction to the volume 
discusses Hempel’s paper and its influence on the DSM.  
 
Hempel’s work and its place in psychiatric history are a classic example of 
the formative role of philosophical inquiry in psychiatry…We aspire to 
build on Hempel’s example in this book – to reveal assumptions, to point to 
alternatives, to answer nosological questions outside the domain of 
empirical research while maintaining a commitment to an empirical 
psychiatry. As a monograph of the Association for the Advancement of 
Philosophy and Psychiatry, this book represents an outgrowth of that 
organization’s values and interests (Sadler, Wiggins & Schwartz, 1994, pp. 
2-3)  
 
In these examples the idea that Hempel influenced the DSM is taken to show that 
philosophy of psychiatry is worth doing, and Hempel’s paper illustrates the sort of project 
that philosophers of psychiatry might usefully undertake (for other papers where 
references to Hempel play a similar role see Stein 1991; Monti 1996, Fulford 2002; 
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Fulford, Sallah & Woodbridge, 2007). As a subdiscipline, the philosophy of psychiatry 
aims to be both academically respectable philosophy and also to be practically useful for 
psychiatry.  The myth that Hempel influenced the DSM-III has played a key role in 
enabling the presentation of the philosophy of psychiatry as a subdiscipline that can 
demonstrably achieve both goals; when he presented his paper, Hempel was 
unquestionably a great philosopher and the DSM is clearly an important classification.   
 
Kari McLeod (2000) examined the key role played in the construction of the discipline of 
medical geography by the idea that John Snow used mapping to discover the role of 
polluted water in spreading cholera. She argued that there is ‘a need for disciplines to 
have myths and for authors to memorialize disciplinary heroes in ways that reflect or help 
to create disciplinary identity’ (McLeod, 2000, p.932). We suggest that transforming 
Hempel into a disciplinary role model among those interested in the interface of the 
mental health field and philosophy has played a similar role in the development of the 
subdiscipline of philosophy of psychiatry. As in McLeod’s case, once the idea that 
Hempel influenced the DSM-III became current, references to Hempel’s influence snow-
balled. The idea that Hempel influenced the DSM-III has been attractive to philosophers, 
and so has been regularly, and often somewhat uncritically, repeated. 
 
We suggest that the acceptance of the myth of Hempel among philosophers of psychiatry 
has had at least one unfortunate consequence; it has made the question of whether and 
how philosophy might influence psychiatry seem unproblematic. In the myth, Zubin 
realized that classification might be a problem that could benefit from philosophical 
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input.  Thus, he invited a great philosopher to speak.   Hempel delivered a paper that 
addressed the concerns of psychiatrists, and the psychiatrists of the time then acted on his 
philosophical suggestions. We think it likely that such a vision of transdisciplinary 
influence may be naïve. Communicating across disciplines, so that philosophers can 
appreciate the problems that are of concern to mental health professionals, and so that 
these professionals will act on philosophical advice, may well be harder than the myth of 




We have shown that Hempel did not argue that psychiatry should adopt an atheoretical 
approach to classification, and he did not introduce operational definitions in the context 
of psychiatric nosology. The diagnostic approach adopted by the DSM-III cannot be 
traced to the work of Hempel but has a different lineage.   
 
We have shown that the idea that Hempel influenced the DSM is a myth. This has 
implications chiefly for the question of the potential significance of philosophy for 
psychiatry. The idea that Hempel’s influenced the DSM-III has been used to argue that 
philosophy of psychiatry is worthwhile, and to provide an example of the sort of work 
that philosophers of psychiatry might seek to emulate. However, while the claim that 
Hempel influenced the DSM-III has been attractive to philosophers of psychiatry, it is a 
false claim, and the potential significance of philosophy for psychiatry must be defended 
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Further discussion of the quantitative analysis of citations to Hempel’s paper.   
 
 
Breakdown of citations to the two versions of Hempel’s paper 
 
Figure 1 (in the main paper) compared citations to both versions of Hempel’s paper 
combined with citations to papers by Stengel and by Ward et al. In the main paper we 
combine citations to both editions of Hempel’s paper, rather than considering citations to 
each edition separately, as we are interested in tracing the influence of his argument 
(which is identical in the two editions). For many purposes, one might have concerns 
about the fairness of comparing two editions of a paper published once in conference 
proceedings and once in a collection of philosophy essays, with papers published in 
medical journals. However, we think that such concerns do not threaten our primary 
argument. Our main aim is to show that Hempel’s paper was originally not very 
influential, and is now cited much more than in the years leading up to the publication of 
DSM-III, and our methodology is sufficient to establish this claim. 
 






Fig.2 Citations to Hempel 1961 and 1965 
 
 
The earlier (1961) edition, published in the conference proceedings, is the most 
frequently cited version up to 1996-2000, when the 1965 edition, published in a volume 
alongside other philosophical essays by Hempel, starts to become cited more frequently. 
We think it likely that this shift can be largely explained by changes in ease of access to 
the different editions, rather than, for example, suggesting that Hempel’s paper came to 
seem more relevant to philosophers than to mental health researchers. Academic libraries 
tend to retain philosophical works much longer than they do medical works. For this 
reason, Hempel’s 1965 collection of philosophy essays, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 
is still readily available in most academic libraries, while the 1961 conference 




















On the possibility of quantitatively analysing citations to Hempel by type of literature. 
 
One might wonder whether it would be possible to reveal more about the sorts of use that 
have been made of Hempel’s paper through further quantitative analysis of citations. 
Looking through citations to Hempel’s paper in Google scholar, it is clear that many 
citations are in mental health journal papers, that many are in work in the philosophy of 
psychiatry, and that Hempel’s paper is also cited in work across a range of other 
disciplines. We have decided not to attempt a quantitative analysis of the extent to which 
Hempel’s paper is cited in different literatures. A number of methodological problems 
would plague any such attempt. First, it is not clear whether there is equal coverage 
across disciplinary areas (for example, of philosophy of psychiatry and mental health 
publications) in Google scholar. Second, citation practices differ between disciplines 
(papers in psychiatry and psychology tend to contain rather more passing references than 
do papers in philosophy), and it is unclear how this might be weighted. Third, in many 
cases it is unclear how a work might be categorised, for example, sometimes 
philosophically-oriented work is written by psychiatrists and published in psychiatry 
journals.  
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